The phrases "peacekeeping", "peace enforcement" and "peace operations" never appear in the United Nations Charter.

It's true.  Are you surprised?

Generalized as peace operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions are practical, pragmatic solutions for dealing with unruliness between, among and within states.  A United Nations Security Council Resolution legitimizes these complex, multinational, multidimensional civil-military missions. Usually. 

Or, if we can't get our heads around a particularly vexing political problem where all wants and desires for power, control and influence can be met for all actors, we bumble through a series of fuzzy, dangerous and costly missions at the behest of a series of poorly written resolutions.  The point: a peace operation is predominantly a political activity. 

Chapter VI of the UN Charter, titled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" sets the scene for the use of what are known as the more 'traditional' peacekeeping activities, such as disarmament, demobilization and observation, as part of a negotiated settlement or agreement by any other peaceful means of choice.  Peacekeeping pertains to the preservation or monitoring of peace, especially the international supervision of a truce between hostile nations.  Simply put, in peacekeeping as envisioned under Chapter VI, there must exist a peace to keep. 

Peacekeeping in this traditional sense has been ongoing since 1948.  Peace was often possible at all because of the relative stability provided by the balance of power characterized during the Cold War.  Much of that surety went away with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the eventual loss of superpower advocacy.  There was always the threat of total nuclear annihilation keeping squabbles between states -- as well as within them -- more or less in check.  But this traditional form of peacekeeping has become the exception rather than the rule in the Post Cold War period.

When there is no negotiated peace between stable nation-states, as is increasingly our experience today, other countries may decide to impose stronger measures to be carried out with or without the consent of all the parties to the conflict.  Generally termed peace enforcement, these measures are legitimized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."  By golly, we'll force a 'peace' through a UN Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII.  As is the case for East Timor, this may involve the separation and disarmament of conflicting parties using force as required, and as governed by the rules of engagement.  Then we'll enforce that peace to ensure stability in the area, to permit the delivery of humanitarian aid, to protect vital national interests, and so on.

Such challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty are resulting in blurred lines between traditional peacekeeping under Chapter VI, and the more aggressive, obtrusive and interventionist activities that may be permitted under Chapter VII.  Further, the legality of intervention is in question when no Security Council Resolution exists authorizing it, yet a 'coalition of the willing' forms to hammer away at the perceived problem, ala NATO's military activities in Kosovo.  Sometimes it is easiest to pass the entire problem to a nation willing to generate a 'coalition of the willing' as per the United States and its allied forces' activities during Desert Storm.

Confusing?  You bet!  Difficult to accomplish?  Absolutely!  Why?  Fuzzy language, conflicting will of member states, divergent national interests, historical legacy, ignorance and politics, to name a few reasons.

In the UN Charter, the mantra of 'international peace and security' is frequently intoned but never defined.  Security Council Resolutions can spell out a mandate that includes tools borrowed from both Chapters VI and VII, depending upon the political situation at hand.  Each of the permanent five members of the Security Council has veto power.  Resolutions may be fuzzy or downright impractical because of ignorance or intent, resulting in a lack of support by the General Assembly responsible for funding the mandate.  Hence, on the one hand, a Security Council member state may approve passage of a resolution but on the other hand vote against funding it when the resolution reaches the General Assembly.  The UN functions only as well as its member states want it to.

But have heart!  When the political will exists to solve a problem, effective solutions appear -- seemingly as if by magic.

We can prepare for that magic.  By assigning resources to the preparation of forces for effective participation in peace operations, we, collectively speaking, are in a better position to achieve success when put to the test, and when given the chance.

By the very definition of these missions, integrated training between multinational civilian and military agencies is required.  The Center of Excellence, one among several entities who are taking on this task, has been developing and implementing a program, the Asia Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building Program, to help meet the needs of countries to effectively participate in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.  A description of the efforts resulting from the implementation of this program and a broader look at peace operations provide the foundation for this issue of The Liaison.

Brien Hallett of the Matsunaga Institute of Peace whets the palette via an introduction to the whole notion of war and conflict in his thoughtful essay "Civil-military relations: divisive gap or unifying goal?"

We are sure you will be delighted with the many submissions from our readers and staff members.  They represent a great breadth of knowledge in the 'industry' but also show the passion that keeps us in this field.  We hope they inspire you to respond in writing for publication in a future issue of The Liaison.