A key to meeting the demands of modern peace operations lies in applying sufficient resources to fulfilling the specialized education and training requirements of civilians, civilian police and military personnel likely to be involved in peace support operations.

Two initiatives that are committed to increasing peace operations capacities within the Asia-Pacific region are the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities and the Asia-Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building Programs. Both programs have education and training as their respective centerpieces. As a bonus, both are within the context of the U.N. secretary general's response to the recently released Brahimi Report and its recommendations.

In order to better understand how these initiatives play out in the world of peacekeeping relative to the Brahimi Report, important to first put the report in perspective. (Overview of the Brahimi Report located on inset). The Brahimi Report will set the stage and later, a case study based on a recent peace-keeping training exercise held in Bangladesh will serve to illustrate how the director and actors come together to increase peace operations capacities.

The backdrop: The Brahimi Report

The report places a great deal of emphasis on the responsibility of the U.N. member states to establish standards for use in peace operations. In part, the Brahimi Report reads: "The United Nations should establish the minimum training, equipment and other standards required for forces to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations."

To date, because of insufficient administration and managerial support for peace operations, progress has been difficult. This is a situation well recognized by Secretary General Kofi Annan. In an attempt to implement the recommendations of the report, Annan said: "There are only 32 posts authorized for military officers in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in comparison with over 30,000 military personnel in the field... I have thus requested an increase in resources for the Military Division."

The Brahimi Report panelists had confirmed Annan's suspicions. They made statements and recommendations that go to the general state of preparedness and readiness of coalition forces, requiring a substantial commitment of resources to educational activities prior to consideration for deployment to an operation.

The panel recommended that prior to deployment, each potential troop contributor should be evaluated to confirm its readiness. Included in this evaluation is an assessment of training and education requirements. Further, based on the premise that, "neither the outbreak of war nor the conclusion of peace can always be predicted well in advance," the panel recommended that the "Secretariat must be able to maintain a certain generic level of preparedness, through the establishment of new standing capacities and enhancement of existing standby capacities, so as to be prepared for unforeseen demands."

Awareness of this emerging paradigm is now materializing in training doctrine. For example, traditional war-fighting exercises are being planned for and designed to take on increasingly complicated scenarios with humanitarian components and multinational participation. Countries in the region have either established their own peacekeeping training centers, are considering them or are actively seeking training assistance from DPKO's United Nations Training Assistance Teams, or UNTATs. Thus, like the phenomenon of the 100th monkey, multiple initiatives are being introduced simultaneously through many avenues; collectively, they represent a multi-pronged approach. Efforts are being made to coordinate these activities and to dovetail the learning process between the classroom and skill-building games and field exercises.

Setting the stage: Building Partnerships to Prepare for Peace Operations

As of 31 October 2000, 89 countries have committed military observers, civilian police, troops, or a combination of these categories to various peace operations. Some have contributed as few as one individual within the last decade, while a handful of countries have sent thousands since U.N. peace operations began in 1948. Many of these nations have extensive histories of participation in peace operations on which to build. However, even those nations with experience recognize that while they bring benefits to the table, they also have much to learn because of the changing nature of these missions. Much of their experience was gained in an earlier time when traditional peace-keeping activities were neither as lethal nor complex as the newer brand characterized by the absence or blatant disregard of the rule of law. In short, they are far more dangerous.

Reinforcing the needs of the robust peacekeeping forces that the panel has advocated, panel members have suggested the partnering of member states and that "the United Nations standby arrangements system (UNSBA) be developed further to include several coherent, multinational, brigade-size forces and the necessary enabling forces."

Annan clearly posits that improvement cannot be realized without it: "The performance of the United Nations... will not improve unless member states, and particularly those possessing the greatest capacity and means to do so, are ready to participate with soldiers, police officers and civilian experts, to support cooperation between countries of the South and of the North."

The potential dividends to countries participating in education and training activities are great: expanded capabilities, greater self-sufficiency, improved relations with other countries. The dividends come at a cost that is greatest to countries struggling to establish a sound economic and social foundation necessary for the survival of their own societal, cultural and financial security. The cost to participate is especially high for developing countries, because it saps already limited resources and severely stressed social fabric. Annan acknowledges this issue, again, writing on the implementation of the panels recommendations: "I echo the concerns expressed by many developing countries to the effect that the increase in resources for peace operations must not come at the expense of the resources needed for development."

The desire for peace is very great, and participation in peace operations for many countries is a source of great pride. Their enrollment, particularly through the contribution of troops, also presents an economic opportunity for developing countries.

Enter stage left: Two Initiatives

Responding to this challenge, the State Department and the Office of the Secretary of Defense created the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative. The National Security Council endorsed the EIPC concept in December 1996 as a means to increase and improve the global pool of capable peacekeepers. EIPC is funded under the Foreign Military Financing account and is executed by the Department of Defense through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California was designated the lead agent for the education and training program of the EIPC initiative in November 1998. In that role, CCMR has developed a Peace Support Operation (PSO) common core curriculum for peacekeeping training centers and provides a three-phased "train the trainers" program for EIPC recipient countries. For every instructor trained under EIPC, CCMR expects to realize several hundred trained peacekeepers in one to three years after EIPC training.

The United States has an interest in assisting in the development of other nations' capabilities, in order to meet its own national interests. EIPC's statement of purpose reads in part: "The [EIPC] initiative is a peacetime engagement tool designed to help increase the pool of armed forces capable of participating in multinational peace support operations. This, in turn, will help minimize the demand for direct U.S. military participation in international peacekeeping operations."

This purpose dovetails nicely with the panel's recommendation on forming partnerships, and providing financial, equipment, training and other assistance to troop contributors from less developed countries to meet standards, as suggested by the Brahimi panel.

With this in mind, then, implementation funding of the EIPC program is considered seed money used to: "enhance the institu-tional capacity of selected countries' professional military education, training and doctrine programs. Where possible, EIPC funds are to be used to foster regional peacekeeping cooperation in conjunction with other recognized peacekeeping initiatives."

'Other recognized peacekeeping initiatives' is a key point. Enter the Asia Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building Program, a series of conferences, seminars, workshops and games that provide a platform for open discussion on peacekeeping activities. Organized by the Center of Excellence, the series began with a leadership conference in Manila, Philippines, followed by a seminar in Bangkok, Thailand a gaming seminar in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and an additional game in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The series emphasizes the multidimensional aspects of peace operations today by gathering a group of civilians from federal governments, U.N. personnel, civilian police, international and non-governmental agencies as well as military personnel from many levels. Participants gain a greater appreciation for the complexities of modern peace operations through the discussions that take place in small group breakout sessions.

The Center adds those pieces not readily supplied by the other players, such as subject matter experts, many of who assist with presentations and training activities after arriving directly from field activities conducted on behalf of their own employer. It assists all of the partnering organizations to bring their greatest strengths to the event and ensures that the appropriate level of complexity is addressed. As does EIPC, it focuses on training the trainers and content development, providing a philosophical complement.

The play's the thing: The Bangladesh Case Study

Bangladesh has an extensive, though by no means singular, history of participation in peace-keeping activities. It ranks fourth as the largest contributor to U.N. peace support operations in the world, including 74 observers, 186 civilian police personnel and 2,134 troops, for a total of 2,394 personnel actively engaged in peacekeeping operations. The top manpower contributors are India (4,469 total), Nigeria (3,441 total) and Jordan (3,400 total).

Participants of the South Asia Peace Operations Gaming Seminar, the third event in the Asia Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building Program, observed first hand the training activities of the Bangladeshi Armed Forces at their Peacekeeping Operations Training Centre (PKOTC) located near Dhaka in Rajendrapur.

The hour-long demonstrations highlighted four training sessions: patrolling, mob control, hijacking/ kidnapping and check point control. They are a part of the larger education and training course titled Contingent Members' Course (CMC-3).

Participants of the 26-day course are both officers and enlisted men. The objectives of CMC-3 are to provide general knowledge on UNDPKO, to train essential skills expected of a contingent member as both an individual and a group member, to impart knowledge on the use of equipment such as mine detectors, communications equipment and global positioning systems, to provide mission orientation, and a working knowledge of English and computers. The course syllabus also covers administration issues, first aid, hygiene and sanitation. Currently the center is capable of training individuals and groups of the armed forces and civilian police. Future plans call for increasing housing facilities, establishing a marksmanship efficiency test range, establishing an archive and museum on peacekeeping activities, developing the institute into a regional peace support operations academy, and developing a faculty of research on peace studies.

The gaming seminar served to showcase the efforts made by Bangladesh to modernize its contribution to and participation in peace support operations, and to serve as a regional resource. The demonstrations at Rajendrapur were illustrative of the training instilled during EIPC training events, such as U.S. Army Pacific's Multi-Platoon Training Exercise, which the Bangladeshis attended in Nepal earlier in the year. Key personnel also attended an EIPC course at the CCMR headquarters in Monterey, California in July. Bangladesh was a designated recipient of congressionally appropriated funds to the EIPC initiative of U.S.$1.25 million in fiscal year 1998 and U.S. $800 thousand for fiscal year 1999.

Bangladesh has benefited by the opportunity afforded through partnering. In his opening remarks to the distinguished guests, Brigadier General A.K.M. Fariduddin Ahmed, psc, and commandant at the time, noted: "PKOTC, although now a toddler, is moving fast to acquire all its designed capabilities as soon as possible; to be able to fulfill the needs of a regional PKO training center of international grade. This will enhance greater cooperation amongst the regional countries. With this in view the UNDPKO and UNTAT has already extended their all-out support for this center. Side by side I may make a special mention here about the generous support of the U.S. government and the U.S. Pacific Command under EIPC for promoting this center to its designed goal.Ó

It was in fact the Bangladesh Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General Muhammad Mustafizur Rahman, recently retired, who brought his army full circle. The traditional command and control structure, inherited from the British colonial period, had served the Bangladeshi forces well through the earlier period of peacekeeping. But in the Nepal exercise, Mustafiz witnessed his men flounder when, for the exercise, the officer in charge was Ôkilled.Õ This led him to apply at least one lesson learned from this experience: use a command structure that permits the mission to continue by decentralizing power, a strategy that has proven more effective in the peace support situations encountered today. He went back to Bangladesh, fixed the problem, and displayed the results to gaming seminar delegates eight months later.

Denouement

Not only has Bangladesh benefited. Ultimately the success of a peace support mission depends upon the preparedness and readiness of a committed coalition force supported by the adequate political will to see the mission through. Through such efforts as EIPC and the Asia Pacific Peace Operations Capacity Building Program, and partnering, as suggested by the Brahimi Report and endorsed by Annan, the effort to increase peace operations capacities within Asia-Pacific now has a foothold in the region.

 

The Brahimi Report:
Milestone in Peace Operations
By James T. Wigdel

On March 7 2000, Kofi Annan, secretary general of the United Nations convened a high-level international panel to thoroughly review U.N. peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations that will assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.

Annan appointed Algerian born Lakhdar Brahimi, under-secretary-general for special assignments in support of the secretary-general's preventive and peacemaking efforts, to chair the panel. Subsequently, the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations has since come to be known as the "Brahimi Report."

The report has been characterized as inclusive in its doctrine and as a capstone document. John Otte, director of training at the Center and former U.N. peacekeeping training advisor sees it as a compilation or integration of many other reports such as the Agenda for Peace Parts One and Two as promulgated by former U.N. Secretary General Butros Butros Ghalli.

Other documents that came before the report with similar connotations include the General Assembly Resolution 49/37, the Comprehensive Review on Peacekeeping and the Annual Reports on Peacekeeping Affairs by the special Commission for Peacekeeping Operations. "It's a logical follow on to these reports." Otte said adding, "Its an evolutionary not a revolutionary document." However, Brahimi is updated as of right now, and reflects the most recent lessons learned such as those from East Timor.

In the transmittal letter to the president of the General Assembly and the president of the Security Council Annan said, "the panel's analysis is frank yet fair; its recommendations are far reaching yet practical," and he fully endorsed the report by the independent panel.

On 23 August 2000, the United Nations issued a press release in which Annan urged world governments to join in implementing far-reaching changes in the structures and management of U.N. peace operations recommended by the panel, saying that prompt action was "absolutely essential to make the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace."

The report recommends, among other reforms: extensive restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; a new information and strategic analysis unit to service all U.N. departments concerned with peace and security; an integrated task force at headquarters to plan and support each peacekeeping mission from its inception; and more systematic use of information technology.

Many of the proposed changes require political, financial or operational decisions from the United Nations Member States. For instance, the panel urges the Security Council not to finalize resolutions authorizing large peacekeeping missions until Member States have pledged the necessary troops and resources; and recommends an increase in funding to strengthen the peacekeeping support staff at U.N. Headquarters.

The secretary-general set up the panel after publishing two reports last year, which highlighted the United Nation's failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and to protect the inhabitants of Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) in 1995. Annan had said, "we must all do our utmost not to allow such horrors ever to happen again." He asked the panel to make "a clear set of recommendations on how to do better in the future in the whole range of United Nations' activities in the area of peace and security."

The following are among some of the key changes recommended in the report as reported by the United Nations:

Doctrine and strategy: The panel calls for more effective conflict prevention strategies, pointing out that prevention is "far preferable for those who would otherwise suffer the consequences of war, and a less costly option for the international community than military action, emergency humanitarian relief, or reconstruction after a war has run its course." It says peacekeepers must be able to defend themselves and their mandate, with "robust rules of engagement," against those who renege on commitments or seek to undermine peace accords by violence. It urges the Secretariat to draw up a plan for developing better peace-building strategies. Peacekeepers and peace-builders, it says, are "inseparable partners," since only a self-sustaining peace "offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces."

Mandates: The Secretariat "must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates."

Transitional civil administration: A panel of international legal experts should explore the idea of an interim criminal code, for use in places where the United Nations is given temporary executive powers (as currently in Kosovo and East Timor), pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and law enforcement capacity.

Timelines: "Traditional" United Nations peacekeeping operations (sent to monitor ceasefires and separations of forces after inter-state wars) should be fully deployed within 30 days; more complex peace operations, sent to help end intra-state conflicts, within 90 days.

Personnel: Member States should work together to form "coherent, multinational, brigade-sized forces," ready for effective deployment within these timelines; and should each establish a national pool of civilian police officers. The panel does not call for a standing U.N. army, but says the Secretariat should establish "on-call" lists of about 100 military and 100 police officers and experts, from national armies and police forces, who would be available on seven days' notice to establish new mission headquarters. Conditions of service for civilian specialists should also be revised so that the United Nations can attract more qualified personnel, and reward good performance with better career prospects.

Speed and efficiency: The secretary-general should be allowed funds to start planning a mission before the Security Council approves it, so that when approved it can be deployed quickly. Field missions should be given greater freedom to manage their own budgets. Additional ready-made mission "start-up kits" should be maintained at the U.N. Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy.

Funding for peacekeeping support: The panel remarks that, after 52 years, it is time to treat peacekeeping as a "core activity" of the United Nations rather than a "temporary responsibility." Headquarters support for it should therefore be funded mainly through the regular U.N. budget, instead of the current "Support Account" which has to be justified year-by-year and post-by-post.

Since its release, the Brahimi report has been the subject of many discussions surrounding the future of peacekeeping operations and the direction it should take in the new millennium. To view the full report, go to: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations and follow the link to the Brahimi Report.