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Purpose

This session focused on the status of the affected country or region that defines the conclusion of the intervention. While Session 1 focused on coalition building and foreign policy choices, or the strategic process of mustering of forces to be brought to bear on the problem, this session focused on the nature of the strategic "end game," or the achievement of the objectives as defined by the players.

Background

Nations react and respond to crises for humanitarian reasons, national interests, security for its citizens, and so forth. Multinational and organizational coalitions may be built and a response mounted and executed with some degree of planning and understanding of what the general desired outcomes are. Quite often, however, the complex nature of the crisis and the extent of damage to state institutions, the economy, society and environment of the affected areas are underestimated, or the desired end state is not adequately and comprehensively considered and factored in to the planning process. Political needs, in addition to a lack of understanding about the challenges to a recovery to normalcy and sustainable peace in failed states, contribute to poorly designed and executed end games.

Discussion Points

1. How are exit strategies related to end states?
2. What elements constitute the end state of a complex emergency and how are they established?
3. Who determines the end state?
4. What role do the indigenous populations play?
5. Do those intervening share the same vision for the end state?
6. What are the differences between military versus political end state?
7. How is transition planning executed?
8. How do concepts such as sustainable security or durable peace impact transitions and end states?

Discussion Summary

Timelines do not determine end state. End state is determined by the probability of a return to war. It follows then that the desired end state is some point beyond peace building. End state is a return to normalcy, though not necessarily a return to the way things were, but it is a point where peacekeeping is not needed.

Economic stability and opportunity, and stable and functioning government institutions are keys to preventing a return to conflict. Someone has to make a subjective judgment when government and economic institutions are functioning and the point or points are reached at which control can be handed over to local authorities-- these points are driven and determined by situation.

It follows that the end state for peace support missions is meaningless without full participation by all relevant UN agencies. Who is the UN? The UN is we -- all participating members states. Situations that are purely peace building may never go before the Security Council. The UN should have a common understanding -- a single lead nation should not define the end state.

How do you determine what is normal UN development work and what falls under a mandated Security Council resolution, dictated by security concerns? Normalcy is a situation where there are safety nets. For example, is it possible for an East Timor to form its own police force?

The UN Mission in Bosnia is police only. They have identified where the end state is. Will what they leave behind be a viable country?

Can a distinction be made between a military end state and a civilian end state? The military end state should be contained within the civilian end state -- the military should be in support of the civilian authorities. Exit strategies, on the other hand, are related to the sovereign accountability for the different factions of the peace support forces. Each country has its own commitment. The UN should be the one to define the end state and the process should be a gradual one. The nesting of end states with peace and security is one part of a much bigger picture.

If troops are not left in long enough, that is, the point at which war is not considered an option, the mission is wasted. The higher the numbers of troops, which are sent as part of the peace support mission, the better are the chances for success.

The peace operation should end when there is a safe and secure environment. But it should not be about military strategies. Peace operations as we define it should see as its end state normalcy in an economic state, not in the military state. The military should have an exit strategy but the end state is always economical in nature.

End state strategy different for different regions. For example, in East Timor, the UN mission is successful there, but when peacekeepers leave, problems are still there. They need money to train their armed forces, and they have a border problem. At beginning stages, the Australians played a lead role, but last year, Australia was reluctant to continue to give funds directly, but was eager for the UN to step in. At one point the UN suffered from lack of funds and the Korean contingent selected to withdraw. We see potential problems -- the situation is peaceful now, but there still don't have military forces to maintain the border. End state strategies should provide sufficient funding to take care of issues such as this.

There are separate missions -- one is the peacekeeping mission (military) and the other is peace building, associated with various UN agencies: we need to separate these. Some countries believe that peacekeeping is peacekeeping and development is development -- funds for one thing should not be used for the other. Funds for development should not be put to military use, and so on. That is a government's policy, to not see peacekeeping as peace building.

There are the realities of the process, politics and national interests to consider. For example, peace support operations consist of a continuum of activities. Some countries will participate in some kinds of security operations and peace building measures, but not others. Who will do what, and when, is part of a sorting out process that began with the end of the Cold War, which also marked the end of the traditional peacekeeping paradigm.

As soon as the UN Secretary General identifies a trouble spot, someone needs to start putting together along term plan. When a situation does develop, there is need for a task force and support from headquarters. Task Force participants should be inclusive of all parties -- military, political, refugee, etcÉ enough of the players who can think through all things that need to be done. Also, it should be this Task Force who put together the initial SG report, which forms the basis on which individual countries write in their contributions, which becomes mandate. Thus the plan will be more broadly accepted.

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